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French Canada and the Western School Questions 
Two recently published books, first prepared as Ph.D. theses, examine the 
interaction of church and state during the separate school crises in Manitoba 
and the North-West Territories.l Though numerous studies have been made 
of both these closely related issues, Paul Crunican and Manoly Lupul are 
the first to have exploited the archives of the Catholic Church. In doing so 
they add an essential dimension to our understanding of two critical develop-
ments in the defining of French Canada's status within Confederation. It is 
clear that the victory of the public school system in western Canada helped 
to ensure that the French Canadians would not feel secure as a distinct 
culture outside Quebec. But the question then arises, why did the French 
Canadians in Quebec not take a stronger stand in defence of minority rights 
outside their Province? In 1896 they rejected the Conservative party though 
it supported a remedial bill designed to ensure separate schools. In 1905 all 
but two Quebec Liberal M.P.'s supported Laurier when he bowed to Protes-
tant pressure on the separate school issue in Alberta and Saskatchewan. 
Crunican feels that in 1896 Quebeckers had simply lost faith in the ability 
and willingness of the Conservative government to redress the grievances 
of the Manitoba minority. This cannot be denied, but he may be going too far 
when he claims that they felt Laurier would be more successful. The tradition-
al theory of Laurier winning Quebec in spite of his school policy still makes 
more sense. Lupul confines himself more strictly to Ottawa and the Terri-
tories, but he makes it very clear that by 1905 most French Canadians 
realized the futility of trying to force their institutions upon a hostile majority. 
In fact it is quite probable that they already felt this way in 1896. 
The attitudes of Quebec toward the Manitoba School Question were em-
bodied to a remarkable degree in one man, Lieutenant-Governor Adolphe 
Chapleau. Historians are almost unanimous in declaring that, as spokesman 
for Quebec's moderate Conservatives, Chapleau might well have rescued the 
province for the government had he consented to join the Cabinet prior to 
the election. The disagreement arises as to why he stayed out. Neatby and 
Saywell have attributed his behaviour to his hostility towards the ultramon-
tane wing of the party2, while Crunican echoes Lovell Clark in claiming that 
1 Paul Crunican's Priests and Politicians: Manitoba schools and the election of 1896 (Toronto, 
University of Toronto Press, 1974) was submitted to the University of Toronto in 1968. 
Harvard accepted Manoly R. Lupul's The Roman Catholic Church and the North-West 
School Question: a study in Church-state relations in Western Canada, 1875-1905 (Toronto, 
University of Toronto Press, 1974) in 1963. 
2 H. B. Neatby and J. T. Saywell, "Chapleau and the Conservative Party in Quebec", CHR, 
XXVII (1956), pp. 1-21. 
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he was simply skeptical of the government's sincerity on the school question.3 
However he has only Chapleau's own word to support this theory, while he 
fails to refute the Neatby-Saywell argument that if Chapleau had been deeply 
concerned about the remedial legislation, he would have joined the Cabinet 
in order to fight more effectively for its passage.4 This raises the possibility 
that the western minority had simply been written off, leaving the Manitoba 
School Question as a mere excuse for a confrontation between forces com-
peting for power within Quebec itself. 
The extent to which politics influenced and distorted the school issue is 
carefully and ably described by Crunican throughout his book. He removes 
any lingering doubts of a possible Laurier-Greenway conspiracy to embarrass 
the Conservative government, but reveals how Clifford Sifton used the issue 
to bolster provincial rights sentiment in Manitoba. Sifton outmanoeuvered 
the clumsy Ottawa negotiators with every encounter, skillfully presenting 
them as the coercive tool of the Catholic Church. To be fair to the Conserva-
tives, Crunican implies that Sifton's task was made easier by the hard line 
positions taken by the two successive archbishops of Manitoba, Taché and 
Langevin. Both can be defended for refusing to play politics with what they 
considered the sacred rights of their people, but their strongest supporter, 
Mgr. Laflèche of Trois-Rivières, was not so politically impartial. His anti-
Liberal prejudices kept him so firmly committed to the government that he 
refused to consider the suggestion of disgruntled ultramontanes that French 
Canadians abandon the Conservatives to form their own nationalist party. As 
Crunican points out, Laflèche's contribution to the Catholic cause was 
questionable on two counts. By encouraging the government to take a hard 
line from the first, he helped to eliminate any possibility for an amiable com-
promise with Manitoba. Then, when the Conservatives began to waver on the 
issue, the Catholics found themselves with no one to turn to. Too close an 
identification with one party had ultimately weakened the political impact of 
the Church. Bishops Fabre and Emard of Montreal and Valleyfield under-
stood this much more clearly than Laflèche, which helps to explain why they 
insisted that the 1896 mandement should not openly endorse the Conserva-
tive party.5 
Crunican has found that Emard and Fabre were also very sensitive to the 
possibility that an overly-close identification between Church and party 
would eventually alienate many Catholics from their priests. They argued that 
the faithful could not help but be skeptical when it became known that, in 
3 Crunican, p. 242; Lovell C. Clark, "A History of the Conservative Administrations 1891 to 
1896" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1968), pp. 540-5. 
4 Neatby and Saywell, p. 21. 
5 See Crunican, pp. 187-8, 258-70. 
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return for redress of grievances, the Conservatives were demanding open 
clerical intervention in favour of their candidates. Consequently the 1896 
mandement left an opening for Catholics to vote for Liberal candidates who 
had pledged support for some form of remedial legislation, and nearly all of 
the French-speaking Liberals took this pledge. In addition the majority of 
bishops maintained a scrupulous neutrality throughout the election campaign. 
Crunican therefore agrees with Clark that Quebeckers, in supporting Laurier, 
did not repudiate religion for race.6 But Crunican overlooks the possibility 
that the bishops may have adopted such a moderate stand simply because 
they were afraid that Quebec would vote Liberal anyway. Emard of Valley-
field, in opposing outright endorsation of the Conservative candidates, 
warned that "Il faut nous ménager une position tenable et honorable, pour 
le cas très possible, ou nous devons nous présenter, comme pétitionnaires, 
devant un gouvernement composé des adversaires d'aujourd'hui."7 
To test the hypothesis that the Quebec electorate felt little inconsistency 
as Catholics in voting for Laurier, Crunican analyzes the effect of clerical 
intervention at the local level. From his discovery that "the pattern of vote 
swing to the Liberals across the country does not seem to have been very 
predictable by whether the clergy were active, or accused of being active, 
for the Conservatives",8 he concludes that the race-religion or Laurier-
Church conflict really did not exist. But is it not more rational to conclude 
from this evidence that Laurier's appeal was so strong that voters were 
simply ignoring the advice of their clergy? Surely the Quebeckers could not 
have been unaware that their Church officially favoured the Conservatives. 
Crunican has shown that the lines between the Liberals and the Church were 
not as rigidly drawn as we have been led to believe, but there is still no deny-
ing that there was a conflict, and that Laurier was the victor. This is not to 
argue that the conflict was between nationalism and/or liberalism and 
religion. The clergy was as nationalistic as the Liberals, and the Liberals had 
long since abandoned their radical, anti-clerical ideology. Although it may 
not have been expressed in such terms, the true issue at stake was whether or 
not French Canada would become more exclusively identified with the prov-
ince of Quebec. As A. I. Silver has pointed out, during the nineteenth century 
the Catholic Church was much more concerned with the West than the aver-
age French-speaking Quebecker was.9 To the Québécois it was more logical 
to vote for a francophone who supported provincial rights than to vote for 
a centralist party whose defence of a small and distant French-speaking 
minority was suspect at best. It is even possible that the moderate position 
6 Ibid., p. 310; Clark, "The Conservative Party in the 1890's", CHAR (1961), p. 71. 
7 Quoted in Crunican, p. 260. 
8 Ibid., p. 310. 
9 A. I. Silver, "French Canada and the Prairie Frontier, 1870-1890", CHR (1969), pp. 11-36. 
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taken by the younger more liberal Quebec bishops was influenced by this 
attitude. 
This hypothesis is strengthened by comparing the Quebec reaction with 
that of the New Brunswick Acadians. In an article published in this journal 
in 1972,10 but overlooked by Crunican, I found that intervention on the part 
of Bishop Rogers of Chatham effectively interrupted the Acadian exodus 
from the Conservative to the Liberal party. The explanation does not lie in a 
stronger front presented by the Church in New Brunswick, for the Bishop of 
St. John remained aloof from the issue; and Rogers was involved in a serious 
language dispute with the Acadians. Nor could the Acadians help but be as 
aware as Quebeckers (with R. C. Weldon and George Foster campaigning 
within New Brunswick) that the Conservative stand on remedial legislation 
left much to be desired. The one significant difference between the two 
francophone populations was that one was a majority within its province, 
while the other was not. The Acadians simply could not afford to reject a bill 
which promised redress of grievances for a fellow Catholic minority. 
Crunican and Clark have probably gone too far in emphasizing that many 
French Canadians voted for Laurier because they felt he would actually 
obtain the more equitable settlement for the Franco-Manitobans. Militant 
expansionist Catholicism was dying with the ultramontane movement, and 
Bourassa (an ultramontane himself) had not yet begun his campaign to arouse 
French Canadians to the danger of abandoning the West to the Anglo-Saxons. 
Aside from the cultural-religious question, it is more than likely that local 
issues and Liberal abandonment of free trade played an important role in the 
Quebec election. Studies of other provinces (Western Ontario, Nova Scotia, 
New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island) have shown that these were the 
two determining factors in most constituencies.11 Until the appearance of a 
detailed analysis of the 1896 election in Quebec, we can only speculate on 
the reasons for Laurier's victory, but indications are that it represented 
the tendency of French Canadians to withdraw ever further into the fortress 
of Quebec. 
If the French Canadians of Quebec refused to jeopardize provincial rights 
for the sake of their Manitoba confrères, they were no more willing to do so 
for those in the North-West in 1905. Laurier and Bourassa put up more of a 
10 J. I. Little, "New Brunswick Reaction to the Manitoba Schools' Question," Acadiensis, 
I (Spring, 1972), pp. 43-58. 
11 L. E. Eayrs, "The Election of 1896 in Western Ontario" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University 
of Western Ontario, 1951); K. M. McLaughlin, "The Canadian General Election of 1896 
in Nova Scotia" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Dalhousie University, 1967); J. I. Little, "The 
1896 Federal Election in New Brunswick" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of New 
Brunswick, 1970); Harold Leard, "The 1896 Federal Election in Prince Edward Island" 
(unpublished M.A. report, University of New Brunswick, 1972). Since Crunican has not 
updated his research since 1968, he has overlooked the last two theses. 
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fight than they had in 1896, but this time the western francophones were a 
much smaller percentage of the population, and their legal position was also 
less secure. Lupul has actually found that the French Canadians in the North-
west were rather pessimistic about the future of their language. Most of those 
who were not indifferent to education preferred state schools where they 
were convinced that their children would be better prepared for employment 
by learning English. The Territories Council began to move towards a public 
school system in 1884, but the Catholic Church was quite successful in defend-
ing its position until the Council was replaced with the more powerful Legis-
lative Assembly in 1888. Even before D'Alton McCarthy arrived on the scene 
in 1889, the Assembly let it be known that it favoured public English lan-
guage schools. In 1890 when the Assembly was permitted to choose its 
language of deliberation, it quickly eliminated French. In 1891, when it 
gained control over the annual parliamentary grant, it undermined dualism 
in education by replacing the Board of Education with a Council of Public 
Instruction directly responsible to the government. In contrast to Manitoba, 
the Catholic schools of the Northwest seemed destined to lose their status 
slowly through administrative measures, making it difficult to determine just 
at what point the Territories government was infringing upon the rights of 
the minority. The federal government and the Privy Council both refused to 
challenge the 1892 school legislation which made the two school systems 
more uniform. Fortunately the Territories government remained content with 
the new controls, leaving the situation quite stable until 1904 when the 
North-West was about to gain provincial status as Saskatchewan and Alberta. 
Laurier's school clauses were challenged by Clifford Sifton, who claimed that 
they would restore elements of the old dual school system. According to 
Lupul, Laurier had wanted only to ensure that there would be no further in-
fringement upon confessional schools, and so he readily agreed to Sifton's 
amendment designed to ensure that the status quo would be maintained.12 
Somehow it still seems more likely that Laurier knew what he was doing from 
the first, but was not willing to risk his government's life over the issue. 
Nor was it simply a matter of giving in to political pressure, for Lupul 
demonstrates that the minority had a very weak legal position. If, on the one 
hand, the North-West had actually entered Confederation in 1870, one could 
argue that the separate school system, which was only later established by 
law, was not guaranteed by section 93. If, on the other hand, the North-West 
did not have provincial status before 1905, again Alberta and Saskatchewan 
did not fall precisely within the scope of section 93 because it was meant to 
guarantee the separate schools which colonies had imposed upon themselves 
before joining Confederation. The school system of the North-West was the 
work of an external authority, the federal government. Technically the 
12 Lupul, pp. 178, 185. 
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Catholics could argue that because Saskatchewan and Alberta were created 
by the Dominion, they should be endowed with a separate school system and 
guarantees for the French language, but this ignored the fact that the North-
west did have a large measure of self-government and its own Ottawa-
approved institutions before 1905. Lupul has discovered that even the minor-
ity's legal adviser felt that the Catholics had no constitutional grounds to 
stand upon. Bishop Legal of St. Albert was prepared to accept the bill, but 
not so his metropolitan, Archbishop Langevin of St. Boniface, who demanded 
a complete return of the separate school system of 1875. However most 
Catholics realized that Langevin's hard line had done little for them in Mani-
toba, where there were no state-supported Catholic schools, even in name. 
Consequently, Langevin's position attracted little support from either his 
fellow bishops or the papal delegate. 
If there had been an election on the issue, as in 1896, French Canadians 
would have been able to vote Liberal with a clear conscience because, 
Bourassa's statements to the contrary, Laurier had gone as far as possible 
under the circumstances to protect minority rights in the North-West. Even 
more than in 1896, most Québécois understood that it was pointless to force 
their institutions upon a region where they had become hopelessly out-
numbered by an unsympathetic majority, particularly when the cost would be 
more federal power and prestige at the expense of the provinces. The fate of 
French Canada in the West did not hinge upon the school questions; those 
issues would not have arisen had that fate not already been sealed. 
J. I. LITTLE 
Maine: A Bibliographical Review 
Since its founding in 1822, the Maine Historical Society has been the center 
of research on the State's past. At its location in Portland, the Society houses 
many of the major document, newspaper, and book collections available 
within Maine. Besides continuing to improve its capacity to make manu-
scripts, newspapers, and books accessible, it has steadily enlarged its list of 
publications and through an arrangement with the New Hampshire Publishing 
Company at Somersworth has built up a good, brief list. Among the books in 
print are Neal W. Allen Jr., ed., Province and Court Records of Maine (6 vols., 
Portland, 1928-1975); Ronald F. Banks, Maine Becomes a State: The Move-
ment to Separate Maine from Massachusetts (Middletown, Conn., 1970); 
Gordon E. Kershaw, The Kenneheck Proprietors, 1749-1775 (Somersworth, 
N.H., 1975), and various reprints of older, but still useful, Maine books such 
as the 1865 edition of William Willis' The History of Portland (reprinted 
